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IT’S ALL MINE, STAY OFF, AND LET ME DO 
WHAT I PLEASE: AN ABYSS BETWEEN THE 
RIGHTS AND DESIRES OF COASTAL PROPERTY 
OWNERS AND PUBLIC PRIVILEGES AND 
PROTECTIONS? 
Colin H. Roberts∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I will examine three established, or at least commonly 
claimed, rights of coastal (littoral)1 property owners in the United States: 
(1) the right to receive sediments seaward of the mean high-water line 
deposited by accretions and ownership of new land uncovered by 
relictions, (2) the right to exclusive use of their dry sand property, and 
(3) the right to build what they wish on their oceanfront lot.  Each of 
these asserted “rights” at times butts heads with laws designed to 
preserve and protect the public’s right to enjoy the coast and the ocean, 
including the public trust doctrine, environmental statutes, and zoning 
regulations.  Taking each of these property claims in turn, my goal is to 
see who, if anybody, is winning the battle between property owners and 
the general public for the use of littoral zones.  Does the answer vary 
with location?  What factors are giving the winner the upper hand?  
When these public and private rights are at odds, can the two be 
reconciled in a manner that respects the owner’s desires while 
concomitantly maintaining public utility, or is this a fruitless endeavor 
because the two are diametrically opposed?  In what respects does the 
law need to be clarified to potentially obviate issues?  
                                            
 ∗ J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., in Political 
Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies from Pitzer College. 
 1. A note on terminology: Littoral means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake as opposed 
to riparian, which refers to rivers and streams. I will use terms like coastal, littoral, 
upland, beachfront, and oceanfront interchangeably to describe the land immediately 
adjacent to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (9th ed. 
2009). 
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Starting with “It’s All Mine,” I will explore how the phenomena of 
accretion, dereliction, and avulsion, both natural and artificial, affect the 
extent of an owner’s title to his or her coastal lot.  I will also extensively 
discuss a fairly recent United States Supreme Court case, Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 
that has important ramifications for determining the boundary of an 
owner’s littoral lot.  Next, with “Stay Off,” I will examine how different 
states have found or created public access and use rights over private 
littoral property and dealt with issues arising from owners’ assertions of 
exclusivity.  Lastly, under “Let Me Do What I Please,” I will look at how 
zoning ordinances and environmental laws, as well as condemnation, 
have been used in different states to limit an owner’s ability to build 
certain structures on their lots—from buildings to sea walls and piers—
for the benefit of the general public.  In what cases have the courts found 
the government went too far in restricting the owner’s use of his or her 
littoral property, and in what cases have they said the danger to the 
environment or the public’s entitled use outweighed the owner’s desire to 
construct what he or she wishes?  
Each of these disputes has important political, economic, and social 
implications because it pits a select group of private property owners, 
who are often wealthy and influential, against the general public, whose 
desire to be near the ocean is steadily growing.2  On a grander scale, 
these legal issues highlight the continuing debate over how to best utilize 
our natural resources and the corresponding struggle for control.   
II.  “IT’S ALL MINE” 
Littoral property owners pay vast amounts of money to live steps 
from the ocean, separated only by a beautiful sandy or rocky beach on 
which they can relax and pursue recreation.  It is no surprise then that 
littoral owners want to hold title to as much of the beach as possible, 
which of course also increases the value of their property.  However, 
unlike other kinds of property, the boundary of a coastal lot is 
ambulatory, shifting with the dynamics of the coastline caused by the 
ocean, weather, and other natural and man-made phenomena.  These 
alterations have important legal implications for oceanfront owners.  Not 
only do they affect the size of a littoral owner’s land, they may also 
                                            
 2. “According to the United States Commission on Ocean Policy, ‘[b]etween 1970 
and 2000, the population of coastal watershed counties grew by 37 million people . . . and 
is projected to increase by another 21 million by 2015.’” DONALD C. BAUR ET AL., OCEAN 
AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 45 (2008) [hereinafter BAUR].    
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relate to issues of beach access and zoning, which I will explore in 
subsequent sections of this paper.  
A.  Accretion, Reliction, and Avulsion 
Coastal owners generally own the land up to the ocean’s high-water 
mark, with the state holding the tidal waters and the land beneath them 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine,3 a common law doctrine that 
enumerates and “preserves the public’s right to use waterways for 
‘commerce, navigation, and fisheries,’ with subsequent court decisions 
expanding the doctrine to include recreational activities and 
environmental protection.”4  
For instance, in California, a littoral owner takes to the ordinary 
high-water mark of neap tides, as distinguished from spring tides.5  In 
neap tides, the high tide is relatively low and the low tide is relatively 
high, so the difference between low tide and high tide is small; spring 
tides, on the other hand, have extreme low tides and high tides, and so 
the fluctuation is greater.6  Unlike in California, in Delaware, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia littoral owners take to the 
low-water mark instead.7 
Littoral property owners have long had the common law right to 
receive extensions of land created by accretion and reliction.8  Accretion 
is defined as “the gradual, imperceptible process of accumulation of land 
by depositing of material from the water.”9  Although the accumulation 
of material such as sand, rocks, and mud, known as alluvion, is gradual 
and imperceptible,10 over the course of time, the resulting additional dry 
                                            
 3. Id. at 48. 
 4. Colin H. Roberts, Boaters Beware: Chapter 595 Anchors State Lands 
Commission’s Vessel Removal Power, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 723, 725 (2012). 
 5. 54A CAL. JUR. 3D Real Estate § 957 (2012).  
 6. Tides – Tidal Moments, SAILING ISSUES, http://www.sailingissues.com/ 
navcourse6.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2012). 
 7. Katie Tannenbaum, Beach Access, BEACHAPEDIA, http://www.beachapedia.org/ 
Beach_Access#Surfrider_Foundation.E2.80.99s_Stance_on_Beach_Access (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Beach Access]. 
 8. See, e.g., Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. 150, 156 (1855) (“Land gained by the sea 
either by alluvion or dereliction, if the same be by little and little, by small and 
imperceptible degrees, belongs to the owner of the land adjoining.”).   
 9. THOMAS STRONG, RIPARIAN RIGHTS ¶ 14, available at http://www.pdhonline.org/ 
courses/l124/l124content.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2012).   
 10. Id.  
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land becomes apparent.11  Reliction (sometimes referred to as 
“dereliction”) “is the uncovering of previously submerged land by a 
permanent rescission of a body of water, rather than a mere temporary or 
seasonal exposure of the land.”12  Therefore, when the ocean washes sand 
ashore, gradually broadening the beach and pushing the ordinary high 
tide line further out, or the receding ocean exposes new land,13 the littoral 
owner gains the additional land notwithstanding the state’s title.  
Accretion can be natural or artificial, with artificial accretion being 
directly caused by human activities.14  Whether accreted land is natural 
or artificial may determine the littoral owner’s right to it.15  For instance, 
in California, the state retains land created by artificial accretion, but  
[a]ccretion is not artificial merely because human activities far 
away contributed to it; it must have been the direct cause of the 
accretion . . . [t]he larger the structure or the scope of human 
activity the farther away it can be and still be a direct cause of 
the accretion, although it must always be in the general location 
of the accreted property to come within the artificial accretion 
rule.16  
However, with certain limitations, other states allow littoral property 
owners to retain land created by artificial accretions.17  
When the change in the breadth of the beach is not gradual or 
imperceptible but rather rapid and readily noticeable, the process is 
                                            
 11. See County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874) (“The test as to what 
is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is, that though the witnesses may see 
from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the 
process was going on.”).    
 12. Michael V. Powell, Riparian Boundaries in Texas, LOCKE LORD LLP (2006) at 7, 
available at http://www.lockelord.com/files/News/52bf6f9c-4dcc-4b59-a7e2-
25f214016565/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7178e364-c72e-4129-8646-
268a72c9fc05/Riparian%20Boundaries%20-%20Powell.pdf [hereinafter Powell]. 
 13. With climate change causing sea level rise, relictions are bound to be much less 
common than accretions, if not nonexistent. For further discussion of sea level rise see 
infra Part IV.B.  
 14. Powell, supra note 12, at 8.  
 15. See id. at 9 (describing how “a riparian owner does not obtain title to an accretion 
when he or she caused that accretion” under Texas law).    
 16.  63 CAL. JUR. 3D Water § 745. See also State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n. v. 
Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 650-51 (Cal. 1995). 
 17. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key 
Assoc., 512 So.2d 934  (Fla. 1987) (holding that, in Florida, a landowner takes land 
created by artificial accretion as long he or she did not participate in the activities 
creating it).  
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known as avulsion.18  Unlike accretion, new land added to the edge of a 
littoral property owner’s lot by avulsion goes to the state, not the 
landowner.19  
B.  “A Case Study”: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection 
In Florida, the boundary between state land and littoral property is 
the mean high-water line, defined as the average height of high waters 
over a nineteen-year period.20 Under Florida law, littoral owners have 
“the right of access to the water, the right to use the water for certain 
purposes, the right to have an unobstructed view of the water, and the 
right to receive accretions and relictions to the littoral property.”21  
Unlike California, littoral property owners can claim land created by 
artificial accretion, as long as the owner did not cause the accretion 
himself; but similar to California, littoral owners do not take land added 
by avulsion, natural or artificial.22  
In 1961, the Florida legislature passed the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act (BSPA), which “establishes procedures for ‘beach 
restoration and nourishment projects’ designed to deposit sand on eroded 
beaches (restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand 
(nourishment).”23  Under BSPA, local governments apply to the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection (Department) for funds to do a 
restoration or nourishment project.24  If the project involves filling 
submerged lands, authorization is required from the Board of Trustees of 
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board).25  The Board sets a fixed 
“erosion control line” (ECL) that replaces the moving mean high-water 
line as the boundary between littoral property and state land.26  
Therefore, when accretions add land and push the mean high-water line 
seaward, the boundary between private and state lands does not move to 
the new high-water line; the boundary remains at the ECL and the littoral 
                                            
 18. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 826 (1989). 
 19. See State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n., 900 P.2d at 660. 
 20. Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2598 (2010). 
 21. Id.  
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 2599 (internal citations omitted).   
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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owners do not take title to the accretions.27  However, littoral owners 
retain all other common-law littoral rights.28  If the beach erodes back 
past the ECL over a substantial distance, the Board may on its own 
restore the beach to the ECL, and must restore it if asked by a majority of 
the owners and lessees in the affected area.29  If the Board does not act 
within one year, the project is canceled and the ECL is retracted.30 
In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied to restore 6.9 
miles of beach eroded by hurricanes by adding seventy-five feet of sand 
seaward of the mean high-water line (what would become the ECL).31  
The Department stated its intent to issue the permits and the ECL was 
accepted by the Board.32  A group of littoral property owners in the 
project area formed a nonprofit corporation, Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. (SBR), and expressed their disapproval for the 
project, but the permits were still issued.33  SBR next challenged the 
project in state court under Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act.34  
The appellate court determined that BSPA “eliminated two of the [SBR] 
Member’s littoral rights: (1) the right to receive accretions to their 
property; and (2) the right to have contact of their property with the 
water remain intact.”35  Because the BSPA, in the court’s opinion, 
amounted to an unconstitutional taking “which would ‘unreasonably 
infringe on [littoral] rights,’” the local governments were required to 
show that they “owned or had a property interest in the upland 
property.”36  
Although the District Court of Appeal vacated and remanded the 
Department’s approval for the permits, it also certified the question to the 
Florida Supreme Court of whether BSPA, on its face, amounted to a 
taking of littoral property owners’ rights without just compensation.37  
The Florida Supreme Court determined that it did not because accretions 
are “a future contingent interest, not a vested property right,” and “there 
is no littoral right to contact with the water independent of the littoral 
                                            
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 2600. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
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right of access, which the Act does not infringe.”38  The Florida Supreme 
Court also admonished the Court of Appeal “for not considering the 
doctrine of avulsion, which it concluded permitted the State to reclaim 
the restored beach on behalf of the public.”39  SBR’s request for 
rehearing was denied, but the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether the Florida Supreme Court’s upholding 
of the project constituted a “judicial taking.”40 
The United States Supreme Court held that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision that the BSPA is constitutional did not create a “judicial 
taking” of land contrary to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as 
applied to Florida via the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The Court stated that 
in order for there to be a taking SBR must have shown that they “had 
rights to future accretions and contact with the water superior to the 
State’s right to fill in its submerged land.”42  The Court noted that this 
case featured the collision of “[t]wo core principles of Florida property 
law”43: 
First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to 
littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does 
not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral 
landowners.  Second, . . . if an avulsion exposes land seaward of 
littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land 
belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s 
contact with the water.  The issue here is whether there is an 
exception to this rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion.  
Prior law suggests there is not.44 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Florida court that the beach 
restoration project was merely reclamation of the public’s land by the 
state.45  Furthermore, because there is no difference between artificial 
and natural avulsion under Florida law, the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision did not eliminate the right to accretions, it “merely held that the 
right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project, because the 
doctrine of avulsion applied.”46 
                                            
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2613. 
 42. Id. at 2611. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 45. See id. at 2612. 
 46. Id.  
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that it might not be fair to littoral 
property owners that state-created avulsions change the nature and value 
of their oceanfront property and perhaps state-created avulsions should 
be treated differently from natural avulsions in regards to its effect on 
rights to accretions. The Court was handcuffed by the fact that Florida 
law recognizes no difference between the two because “[t]he Takings 
Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state 
law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been 
established.”47  The Court declined to hold that “the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision eliminated a right of accretion established under Florida 
law.”48 
The Court quickly dispelled SBR’s second argument, that the BSPA 
project constituted a taking because it abridged the owners’ right to have 
the ocean contact their property, agreeing with the Florida Supreme 
Court that there is no right to contact with the water independent of the 
right of access, which was not affected by the project.49  The Court stated 
that a right to contact with the water is simply unworkable because land 
created by avulsion automatically goes to the state.50 
This case is a good example of a state’s interest in holding land and 
maintaining it for the benefit of the public.  All coastal states face the 
dilemma of how to treat added littoral land, and it is clear that—at least 
with regard to these Florida restoration projects—the public is 
“winning.”    
C.  Drawing a Line in the Sand: Where is the Property Line Between 
State and Private Property? 
As exemplified by Stop the Beach Renourishment, accretion, 
reliction, and avulsion are complicated, inexact doctrines that have 
important implications for littoral property owners.  This observation 
begs the question: should there be more defined standards, such as set 
measurements, to determine when these processes occur, rather than 
relying on vague terms such as “gradual” and “perceptible”?  If so, what 
should these standards be? If, hypothetically, a storm washes ashore two 
or three inches of sediment in a few days, is that amount so nominal that 
it should be considered an accretion even if a keen observer could see the 
difference?  
                                            
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 2612-13.  
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Furthermore, as alluded to by the Supreme Court in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, the law may not be completely fair to oceanfront coastal 
owners.51 Should Florida littoral owners’ be entitled to land created by 
artificial avulsion in a manner similar to artificial accretion, or is it an 
unfair windfall for littoral owners to get a new chunk of private property 
regardless of how it was created, and especially if the state footed the 
bill? 
There is not even consensus across the country on where high-tide 
lines lie in a legal and scientific sense.  While California calculates it 
based on neap tides,52 others states, such as Florida, do not distinguish 
between neap and spring tides.53  Still others simply use the vegetation 
line.54  The federal government calculates the high-tide line as the 
“average height of all tides over a full tide cycle of 18.6 years.”55  Some 
have proposed the uniform adoption of this standard, but this would 
cause chaos for owners of existing structures.56   
The backdrop for these questions and issues is the broader struggle 
between public and private interests that this paper attempts to 
encapsulate.  The state holds submerged land in public trust,57 but littoral 
owners pay vast amounts to own a piece of the beach.  However, a 
compromise has generally been reached allowing owners to hold much 
of the beach as private property, with corresponding private rights, 
subject to certain limitations.  Complications to this general arrangement 
will be examined in the following sections.  The state and littoral owners 
have essentially played to a draw, but as Stop the Beach Renourishment 
illustrates, the state sometimes gets the upper hand because it makes the 
rules.  
                                            
 51. See id. 
 52. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COASTAL SCIENCE 248  (M. Schwartz ed., 2005).  
 53. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct.  at 2598 (explaining that 
Florida uses “the average reach of high tide over the preceding 19 years,” thus, 
differences in spring and neap tides are not specifically important).  
 54. WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE 
DROWNING OF AMERICA’S SHORELINE 248 (7th prtg. 1998) [hereinafter THE BEACHES ARE 
MOVING].  See also 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 7H.0305 (a)(5) (2012) (“The vegetation 
line refers to the first line of stable natural vegetation, which shall be used as the 
reference point for measuring oceanfront setbacks. This line represents the boundary 
between the normal dry-sand beach, which is subject to constant flux due to waves, tides, 
storms and wind, and the more stable upland areas. The vegetation line is generally 
located at or immediately oceanward of the seaward toe of the frontal dune or erosion 
escarpment.”).  
 55. THE BEACHES ARE MOVING, supra note 54, at 248.  
 56. Id. 
 57. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2598. 
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III.  “STAY OFF” 
The right of exclusion is perhaps the most cherished property right in 
the proverbial bundle of sticks; it is, after all, what makes private 
property “private.” Understandably, oceanfront owners want to lie on 
their private beaches and gaze at the crashing waves without having to 
stare at the back of people’s heads and without being disturbed by the 
noises they make, or worse, the trash they may leave behind.  However, 
because tidelands are held in public trust, littoral owners cannot always 
simply kick others off.  Perhaps the phrase “Stay Off” is a bit misleading 
because this article intends to discuss how courts and legislatures have 
used the common law and statutes to determine when there is a right of 
public beach access and use, not the per se legality of efforts made by 
oceanfront property owners to prevent others from crossing their 
beaches.  A whole paper could be devoted solely to that topic.58  
However, the legality of these efforts to exclude is often dictated by the 
legal concepts this article will discuss.  
A.  Beach Access and Use Under the Public Trust Doctrine 
While land below the high-water line is held in public trust by the 
state, the dry-sand beach above it is not within the state’s purview under 
the traditional public trust doctrine.59  This arrangement has led to two 
issues regarding beach access:  
(1) public rights to so-called perpendicular access—that is, the 
right to proceed from an upland position toward the ocean across 
the property owner’s private property (including the dry-sand 
beach) to a point on the wet-sand beach (the area of the beach 
that lies seaward of the mean high tide line); and (2) public rights 
to so-called lateral access—that is, once on the beach, the right 
to proceed up and down the beach by use of the dry-sand portion 
                                            
 58. Examples of the measures littoral owners have taken to exclude beachgoers from 
reaching the ocean from their land include “removing beach access signage, putting up no 
trespassing or private property signs, adding vegetation to block or hide access points or 
make it appear as if it is private property, erecting fences and hiring private security to 
turn away beachgoers.” Beach Access, supra note 7. Malibu, California has had a number 
of infamous incidents and legal battles over beach access. See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf, 
Malibu’s Rich and Famous Fight to Keep Beach Private, USA TODAY, May 3, 2002, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/03/malibu-usatcov.htm. 
 59. BAUR, supra note 2, at 48.  
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and to use that portion of the beach for recreational activities 
such as sunbathing.60  
However, “[a]s a general rule, lateral or horizontal access along the wet 
sand area is a public right.”61 
The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly answered 
whether the public trust doctrine applies to public rights of beach access 
and use.  However, two cases have “shed light on this question.”62  In 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the California Coastal 
Commission attempted to condition the issuance of a permit for 
rebuilding an oceanfront home on the owners granting a public easement 
across their land to reach two adjacent public beaches, without the 
owners receiving any compensation for the easement. 63  The Coastal 
Commission claimed that this was necessary to promote the legitimate 
state interest of counteracting the new, bigger home’s obstruction of a 
view of the ocean.64  However, the Court struck the condition down, 
holding that the easement created a taking of a property right and that it 
had no “essential nexus” with removing obstacles to a clear view of the 
ocean.65  Therefore, “by requiring states to closely link the condition 
imposed on the beachfront property owner to the problem the condition 
seeks to resolve, [Nollan] arguably raises the bar for states seeking to 
invoke the [public trust] doctrine to impose easements allowing lateral 
access across beach property.”66 
The second case was decided the following year.  In Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court acknowledged that various states 
have expanded the public trust doctrine to include recreational and 
economic activities beyond the traditional purposes of fishing, 
commerce, and navigation.67  Therefore, by implication, the public trust 
doctrine can be utilized to permit the beach access necessary to carry out 
these protected activities.68  
While the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on 
whether beach access and use are rights protected under the public trust 
doctrine, various state courts have dealt with the issue.  For instance, in 
                                            
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 162. 
 62. Id. at 49. 
 63. 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).  
 64. Id. at 828-29. 
 65. Id. at 836-37. 
 66. BAUR, supra note 2, at 49. 
 67. 484 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1988).   
 68. BAUR, supra note 2, at 50. 
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Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,69 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court expanded on their previous ruling in Borough of Neptune City v. 
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, which held that the public trust doctrine 
protected recreational activities on municipally owned dry-sand 
landward of the high-water mark, 70 to hold that the public has a right of 
access on a privately owned beach to pursue public trust activities.71  The 
New Jersey court did not base its decision on legal doctrines like 
“prescriptive easements or customary law, but rather on the fact that in 
reality, the public must be able to use the dry-sand area of a beach in 
order to enjoy the wet-sand area.”72  In summarizing its expansive view 
of the public trust doctrine,73 the court commented that “the public trust 
doctrine [is] not [perceived] to be ‘fixed or static,’ but one to ‘be molded 
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was 
created to benefit.’”74  Similarly, California, Hawaii, North Carolina, and 
Washington courts have concluded that the public has access rights under 
the public trust doctrine.75 
However, courts in several other states have been less receptive to 
the idea that the public trust doctrine provides a right of access across 
private littoral property, advancing a restrictive view of the doctrine.76  In 
a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, the court refused to incorporate 
a right of access within fishing and navigation rights, holding that a bill 
allowing public right of passage “between the mean high water line and 
the extreme low water line” was unconstitutional.77  The court stated that 
they could find no authority for the proposition that the public trust 
doctrine “include[s] a right to walk on the beach.”78  As previously 
mentioned, Massachusetts is one of the few states where littoral owners 
take to the mean low-water line as opposed to the high-water line,79 so 
                                            
 69. 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984).   
 70. 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972).  
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the public trust doctrine does not come into effect until below the low-
water mark, located on land that is permanently submerged.  Therefore, 
because the wet sand area between the high- and low-water marks 
(foreshore) is private property, and the court refused to expand the public 
trust doctrine to allow access across it, the public can only fish or 
navigate off of private beaches by entering the water at a public access 
point and then laterally swimming, boating, or simply wading through 
the submerged land.  
The Supreme Court of Maine followed suit in Bell v. Town of 
Wells.80  Despite the fact that, like Massachusetts, littoral owners in 
Maine take to the low-water mark, a state statute “declared [that] (1) ‘the 
intertidal lands of the State are impressed with a public trust’ and (2) the 
rights of the public in intertidal lands under that public trust included a 
right to use that land for recreation.”81  However, the court stated that a 
littoral owner held the intertidal land “subject only to the public’s right to 
fish, fowl, and navigate.”82  Therefore, the statute was on its face an 
unconstitutional taking because the common law reserved no public right 
to recreation.83  It is perplexing that fishing and fowling are activities 
protected by the public trust doctrine, but the right to recreation (a more 
generic and potentially less intrusive activity) is not. This shows that the 
common law scope of the public trust doctrine can be vital. 
Lastly, a decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a 
claimed public trust right to recreate on dry-sand would damage the 
littoral owner, who desired to build a condominium, in a manner 
“specifically proscribed” by the Charter of Maryland.84  
B.  Other Provisions in the Law Permitting Beach Access and Use 
Besides the public trust doctrine, states have used various methods to 
protect the public’s right to access and use of the beach.  For instance, 
the state constitutions of Alaska and California guarantee a public right 
of access to navigable waters.85  Therefore, the right to perpendicular and 
lateral beach access can be inferred.86  Moreover, “North Carolina also 
has a constitutional provision that can be interpreted to support a public 
                                            
 80. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).  
 81. BAUR, supra note 2, at 51 (quoting Bell, 557 A.2d at 176). 
 82. Id. at 51-52. 
 83. Bell, 557 A.2d at 176-177. 
 84. Dep’t. of Natural Res. v. Mayor and Council of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 637 
(Md. 1975). 
 85. BAUR, supra note 2, at 50. 
 86. Id. 
268 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:2 
 
right to beach access.”87  Some states, including North Carolina and 
Washington, actually have statutory provisions granting a public right of 
access.88  The California Coastal Act creates a balance, setting a goal of 
maximizing public access and recreational opportunities while 
simultaneously recognizing “constitutionally protected rights of private 
property owners.”89  The Coastal Act allows the Coastal Commission to 
set conditions on the issuance of permits, including “the dedication of 
easements or payment of mitigation fees,” as long as they meet the 
essential nexus test established by the Supreme Court in Nollan.90  
Beach access advocates have said that Oregon “may have the best 
legal protection for the public’s use and access to its coastal land.”91  Its 
1967 Beach Bill states that access is guaranteed and “establishes a state 
easement on all beaches between the low water mark and the vegetation 
line.”92  Because the vegetation line is higher than where the tides will 
reach, “the general effect is to grant public access to otherwise dry sand 
beaches.”93  
The public has also acquired access rights through common law 
doctrines such as “public easements by prescription, dedication, or 
customary use” and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).94  A 
prescriptive easement over private littoral property can be created by the 
public’s open and notorious adverse use of the property continuously 
“for a certain prescriptive period.”95  An easement by dedication occurs 
when the littoral owner acquiesces in the public’s use of the land and 
there is “maintenance or patrolling of the beach by municipal 
authorities.”96  Easements can also be inferred from the doctrine of 
customary use, which “relies on public use that is ancient, exercised 
without obligation, reasonable and not offensive to an existing law or 
custom.”97 
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Although the CZMA is federal legislation, it incorporates state 
involvement through states’ development of their Coastal Management 
Programs (CMPs).98  After a state’s CMP is approved by the federal 
government in accordance with the federal consistency requirement, the 
federal government must comply with the state’s policies “to the 
maximum extent practicable” when taking action that has “reasonably 
foreseeable effects” on the coastal zone.99  The CZMA encourages states 
“to provide [] public access for recreational purposes” through their 
CMPs.100  Before a state’s CMP is approved, the program must address 
access to public beaches and other public coastal areas of importance.101  
Additionally, some CMPs provide processes for the public to acquire 
access rights across private property.  For instance, California’s Coastal 
Access Program allows private property owners to offer public access 
across their property for recreational use under the Offer to Dedicate 
(OTD) Public Access Easement Program.102 Since 2006, 205 OTDs have 
been created.103  
While the public trust doctrine is a powerful tool in creating a public 
right of access across private littoral property, it is by no means the 
exclusive method.  In fact, as shown, some states have had more success 
in recognizing these rights through other legal concepts and procedures.  
C.  A Change of Heart?: The Curious Case of the  
Texas Open Beaches Act 
Similar to the Oregon Beach Bill, Texas passed the Texas Open 
Beaches Act (TOBA) in 1959 which guarantees unrestricted coastal 
access.104  However, subsequent legislation and court decisions have 
undermined, and perhaps outright eliminated, this guarantee.105  
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In June 2009, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 770 [HB 770], 
which “allows for private development on public beaches on the Bolivar 
Peninsula, essentially privatizing them.”106 Many Texans have criticized 
HB 770 saying it “sets a dangerous precedent for the entire Texas Coast 
and the public’s right to access and use public beaches,” and the Texas 
Land Commissioner refused to enforce it.107  Governor Rick Perry, who 
allowed HB 770 to pass into law without his signature, nonetheless stated 
that a provision in the law allowing littoral owners to rebuild and repair 
their homes, “affect[s] the Texas Open Beaches Act [and] is vague, 
broad and incomplete, and will likely result in litigation between 
homeowners and the state.”108 This was the case even in the event of  a 
meteorological occurrence (i.e. hurricane that erodes a beach). In 
response, later in 2009, voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9, 
which created a constitutional amendment affirming the public’s right to 
access and use the state’s beaches.109  Beach access advocates felt 
assured that Proposition 9 would prevent future legislation incongruous 
with TOBA.110 
But the biggest blow to TOBA, in the form of the case Severance v. 
Patterson,111 was yet to come.  In April 2005, Carol Severance 
“purchased three rental homes on Galveston Island.”112 Shortly after, 
“Hurricane Rita damaged [her] properties and moved the vegetation 
[line] further landward.”113  After discovering that Severance’s property 
was seaward of the vegetation line, and hence on a public strip of the 
beach, state officials offered her $40,000 to remove her property so as to 
comply with the state’s use of a rolling easement114 in TOBA.115  
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Severance and several other littoral property owners rejected the offer 
and filed suit to prevent the state from removing the owners’ property 
pursuant to TOBA.116  
In her suit, Severance alleged that removal of her property would 
constitute a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “violation of substantive due 
process [under the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . and . . . an unreasonable 
seizure of her property [under the Fourth Amendment].”117  The Federal 
District Court dismissed her suit after finding that her constitutional 
claims were not ripe until the state actually removed her property.118  
Severance appealed her Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, and a Fifth 
Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of the Fifth Amendment claim but 
held her Fourth Amendment claim to be ripe.119  The Fifth Circuit panel 
certified three questions to the Texas Supreme Court including, inter 
alia, whether Texas recognizes a rolling easement that allows public 
access and use of the beaches “without proof of prescription, dedication 
or customary rights,” and if so, whether that public right is “derived from 
common law doctrines or from a construction of [T]OBA.”120 
In November 2010, The Texas Supreme Court answered these 
certified questions holding “that because deeds dating from the Republic 
of Texas in 1840 didn’t explicitly mention a public right of access, no 
such right automatically exists.”121  Furthermore, the court held that 
easements wiped out by an avulsive event, such as a hurricane, do not 
“‘roll’ upland,” whereas an easement “destroyed by imperceptible 
erosion” does roll upland. 122  Accordingly, when an easement is 
destroyed by an avulsive event, the state must prove an easement is 
“established by custom, dedication, or prescription in each individual 
case.”123  This decision was met with strong public outcry.  The Texas 
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Attorney General “excoriated” the decision saying that the court 
eliminated the public’s right of access and use of dry-sand without citing 
“a single case, rule, precedent, principle, empirical study, scientific 
review, or anything else.” The Attorney General, along with Jerry 
Patterson, the Texas Land Commissioner; and the defendant in the case, 
called for a rehearing.124 
Due to this pressure, the court granted a rehearing in 2011, and a 
decision was handed down on March 30, 2012.125  In a 5-3 decision,126 
the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision, saying “‘the right to exclude 
others from privately owned realty is among the most valuable and 
fundamental of rights possessed by private property owners’” and that a 
right of public enjoyment of the state’s beaches is “‘unsupported by 
historic jurisprudence’ and ‘a limitation on private property rights.’”127  
Jerry Patterson said that TOBA, at least in this area of Galveston, “is 
dead,” calling it “truly a sad day.”128  Critics commented that although 
the court stated that the public easement rolls if the changes to a beach 
are gradual and imperceptible, the court ignored the “No. 1 truth of 
Texas’ coastal geology” that the “beaches are eroding rapidly,” 
particularly in light of rising sea levels caused by climate change.129 
This case represents a dramatic change in Texas’ law governing 
public beach access and use. In just two decisions, Texas went from a 
framework that was one of the most protective of the public’s right to 
access and use the state’s beaches, to one of the most restrictive, pro-
littoral owners frameworks. Making the Texas court’s ruling even more 
remarkable is that just one year before the first Severance decision, 
Texans voted to entrench their right to access and use beaches in the 
state’s constitution.130  Clearly, the will of the many was ignored to the 
benefit of a few.  This illustrates that the one interpreting the rules can 
decide the outcome of the game.  It remains to be seen if other states’ 
laws protecting public access are vulnerable to similar court challenges.  
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D.  Is the Public Winning the Fight for Beach Access? 
Although there are gradations and a few prominent counterexamples, 
it might seem that, in general, the public is winning the battle with 
littoral property owners because most coastal states have some form of 
recognition of public access rights across private property.131  While 
theoretically true, in reality, these rights are rarely exercised.132  Not only 
are many oceanfront owners good at deceiving and deterring the public 
from crossing and using their private beaches, but much of the public is 
either oblivious to the fact that they have these rights, or are simply 
unconcerned with them.133  
Much of this can be attributed to inadequate infrastructure. For 
instance, “[m]ost states report having an insufficient number of public 
coastal access points, with some states averaging less than one access 
[point] for every ten miles of shoreline.”134 Furthermore, where there is 
access, many states lack proper, or have poorly maintained, amenities 
such as signs denoting access, public restrooms and showers, trashcans, 
and parking spaces.135  Accordingly, educating the public about their 
rights and lobbying for expanded funding to improve amenities have 
become important causes for interest groups that advocate for beach 
access.136  
While the law may generally support the public’s rights, external 
factors have swung the pendulum back in favor of coastal property 
owners.137  Time will tell whether changes in the law and policy will alter 
the balance of power between the beach-going public and private upland 
owners.  
E.  The Need for Clarity in States’ Beach Access Laws 
It is clear that public beach access rights vary widely from state to 
state.138  While some states value highly public access rights, others are 
more sensitive to, and accommodating of, private property rights.139  
Because beach access varies so much from state to state, state 
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legislatures and courts should do more to clarify their particular state’s 
position so that littoral owners have knowledge of their rights vis-à-vis 
the general public’s rights.  As we have seen, some states are very 
forthcoming about their beach access laws, whereas others have not 
taken a clear position.140  Not only does a state need to inform littoral 
property owners of if, when, and how the public may cross and use their 
land, but state legislatures and courts should also take a greater role in 
explaining why public beach access is an important right worthy of 
protection.  Littoral owners have the right to know why their right of 
exclusion is treated differently than landlocked property owners and to 
understand the balance of policies and priorities the state has undertaken 
in reaching its decision.  
IV.  “LET ME DO WHAT I PLEASE” 
Like other property owners, littoral property owners purchase their 
lots with certain hopes and expectations of what they can do with their 
property.141  While it is true that landlocked owners are subject to certain 
zoning ordinances and building codes, littoral owners encounter an 
additional set of challenges and laws when seeking to build on their 
coastal lots; as we have seen, things are just different and more complex 
when it comes to owning coastal property.142  Littoral property “is often 
wedged between a coastal highway and the mean high water mark, 
leaving little flexibility for locating structures on land.”143  Coastal 
development can obstruct access to views of the beach, jeopardize public 
trust rights, harm coastal ecosystems, and deplete resources.144  
Additionally, the regulations meant to abate these societal ills are always 
susceptible to takings claims.145  Depending on the perspective, these 
regulations are usually seen as either red tape that unfairly restricts a 
beachfront owner’s rights or important public protections.  The following 
is an examination of some of these laws and the issues they have raised.  
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A.  Setbacks and Other Methods Used to Regulate Coastal Development 
States use a variety of laws and procedures to protect coastal regions 
from overdevelopment.146  Permits for “certain designated activities, or 
for all activities within a designated coastal region” are a popular 
methodology.147  For example, the conflict in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council stemmed from the permit the appellant littoral owners 
needed to obtain to build their new home, and South Carolina’s 
Beachfront Management Act which requires builders to obtain permits 
before developing new structures in certain areas, including erosion 
control devices like sea walls and bulkheads.148  Like other states, over 
the years, South Carolina has amended this act to include more precise 
coastal regulation tools.149  
One such regulatory tool is the establishment of coastal setbacks.  
Setbacks are imaginary lines representing a distance from the water’s 
edge where coastal development can begin.150  Not only do setbacks 
ensure that littoral owners do not build too close to the state-owned 
public trust lands, but they also limit the risks to structures from erosion 
and violent storms which cause high surf.151  Approximately half of 
coastal states have implemented setbacks lines “creating areas at the 
shoreline where development is prohibited or strictly regulated.”152  
Setbacks can be placed at a reference point such as the average high-
tide line, the extreme high tide line, or the vegetation line, or at a simple 
numerical measurement such as one hundred feet.153  However, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is critical of 
the latter, calling them “arbitrary setback line[s].”154  NOAA claims that 
numerical setbacks, while easy to establish, do not always accurately 
reflect erosion rates.155  For instance, a one hundred foot setback line 
“may not be adequate in a highly erosive area but may be too restrictive 
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in a very stable environment.”156  NOAA recommends establishing 
setbacks that are more closely linked with erosion rates.157 Often setback 
lines are placed at thirty times the annual erosion rate with the hope that 
the structure will last long enough to pay off the typical thirty-year 
mortgage.158 However, even these setback lines are not always adequate; 
they do not account for “catastrophic storm events” like Hurricane 
Katrina.159  Basing setbacks on erosion rates can also be difficult and 
costly because determining the erosion rate requires the accumulation of 
a good deal of data, some of which is not readily available.160  Because 
erosion rates vary with time, setback lines must be periodically examined 
and moved.161  For instance, “South Carolina updates their setback lines 
and erosion rate data every 8-10 years.”162  Furthermore, although 
setback lines based on erosion rates have “more scientific validity and 
receiv[e] deference in judicial proceedings,” these complex formulations 
often confuse littoral owners, “who can more readily understand the 
impact of a fixed setback distance in conceiving their expectations of 
uses of the land.”163 
Some states have taken more indirect paths to limit coastal 
development.  For instance, Massachusetts has refused to pay for coastal 
infrastructure damaged by storms, erosion, and other natural events.164  
The rationale is that if citizens know that the state will not repair roads, 
sewer lines, and beach barriers for them, they will be dissuaded from 
coastal development, thereby shifting costs to littoral owners.165  
Alternatively, states can impose higher costs on littoral owners for 
repairs of damaged infrastructure or assess additional taxes to fund 
anticipated damage.166  However, these strategies are not without their 
risks as states can and have been ensnared in landowner lawsuits alleging 
that erosion was “caused by inadequate construction or maintenance of 
projects.”167  
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B.  Sea Level Rise and Rolling Easements 
Climate change has led to rising sea levels along nearly the entire 
coastline of the United States, “and the rate of that rise is expected to 
accelerate in the coming decades.”168 Rising sea levels present a myriad 
of risks including greater beach erosion, coastal flooding, and saltwater 
intrusion into aquifers.169  According to the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), there are three basic responses to sea level 
rise: (1) shore protection, including beach renourishment projects and 
construction of seawalls and bulkheads; (2) accommodation through 
“coping strategies,” such as placing buildings on pilings; and (3) retreat, 
where people gradually move further inland as the sea level rises.170  Of 
the three options, the EPA suggests that retreat is best in the long run.171  
In terms of accommodation, only so much can be done, and the option 
becomes no longer sustainable.172  Although shoreline protection is a 
viable option for stopping the water, it carries a bevy of negative 
repercussions and risks because it would “eventually eliminate tidal 
wetlands, destroy ocean habitat through dredging, expose millions of 
people to the hazards of living below sea level, and become 
economically unsustainable in many areas where it initially seemed 
successful.”173   
Accordingly, some areas have accepted retreat through the form of 
rolling easements.  With rolling easements, littoral owners cannot stop 
the ocean from coming in through shore protection measures, but all 
other types of public and private use are allowed.174  As the water moves 
further inland, the easement “automatically moves or ‘rolls’ landward,” 
allowing wetlands and other tidal habitats to “migrate naturally” without 
disturbing the natural disposition of sediments.175  The advantage of 
rolling easements is that “[u]nlike setbacks, which prohibit 
development,” rolling easements place no constraints on the littoral 
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owner (other than prohibiting shore protection); in essence, littoral 
owners can  
build anywhere on their property with the understanding that 
they will not be able to prevent shoreline erosion by armoring 
the shore, or the public from walking along the shore—no matter 
how close the shoreline gets to their structure. If erosion 
threatens the structure, the owner will have to relocate the 
building or allow it to succumb to the encroaching sea. . . . 
[E]ventually, as the shore continues to erode, the structure that 
was once on private property, will be sitting on public land. At 
this point, the private owner could decide to relocate the 
structure inland. Alternately, the property owner could allow the 
structure to remain until it becomes unsafe and pay rent to the 
state for use of public land.176  
Therefore, with rolling easements the beachfront owner has greater 
latitude to determine how and when to confront the problem of sea level 
rise: “[l]andowners are not prevented from using their property; they 
simply are prevented from protecting it when doing so eliminates 
tidelands.”177  This allows the state to retain sovereignty of public trust 
lands while giving the littoral owner the feeling invoked by private 
property rights. Consequently, the state becomes less vulnerable to 
takings claims.178  
C.  An Overview of Coastal Regulations and Takings Claims 
The United States Supreme Court has identified two prototypical 
types of takings scenarios: (1) the government’s “permanent physical 
invasion” or confiscation of property, and (2) a regulation that “goes too 
far” in limiting what the owner may do with his or her property.179  While 
“it is generally incontrovertible that there has been a taking of private 
property requiring compensation” with the former, the latter requires 
much more thought and analysis.180  More contemporary Supreme Court 
cases have focused on the “economic impact of the regulation on the 
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property owner and the degree to which the owner’s distinct investment-
backed expectations have been frustrated,” finding that “when the 
landowner has lost all economically beneficial use of the property, 
generally a taking has occurred.”181  
For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,182 a 
coastal developer sought to build residential homes on a barrier island off 
the coast of South Carolina.183  When he applied for a permit, he was 
denied by the Coastal Council because his proposal violated the state’s 
Beachfront Management Act’s mandatory setback lines.184  As a result of 
the denial, Lucas was “effectively prohibit[ed] from building any 
structures on the property.”185  Lucus challenged the denial of his permit, 
but the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim of a regulatory 
taking, reasoning that the statute “sought to prevent serious public harm 
that results from unwise beachfront development.”186   However, the 
Supreme Court of the United States did find that the setback could 
constitute a taking because it “deprived the land of all its economic 
viability,” and the state eventually purchased the property from Lucas.187 
Even more difficult for the Supreme Court to adjudicate are the 
cases, like Nollan, “that fall in between a physical invasion and a total 
loss of property value.”188  For these, the Court has to undertake case-by-
case inquiries that include “factors such as character of the governmental 
action and economic impact of the regulation to determine a taking of 
property.”189 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,190 the Court tackled the issue 
of whether a landowner is precluded from bringing a takings claim when 
the regulation at issue predates the owner’s acquisition of the property.191  
In the case, the littoral owner sought to fill coastal wetlands in order to 
develop his property, but a state statute prevented him from doing so.192  
The Court rejected the state’s argument that Palazzolo lacked standing 
because he acquired title to the property after the statute’s enactment, 
stating that they were not willing “to put an expiration date on the 
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Takings Clause.”193  However, the Court held that the regulation did not 
amount to a total taking because Palazzolo could develop a small portion 
of his property that was upland of the salt marsh, which would have been 
worth roughly $200,000 if developed.194  But critics argue that the results 
of the cases in this gray area of takings jurisprudence are so perplexing, 
inconsistent, and arbitrary that neither littoral owners nor the state can act 
with confidence that their actions are or are not allowed by law.195 
Lucas exemplifies that setbacks are quite susceptible to takings 
claims.  If the setback makes property unbuildable, a littoral owner likely 
has a valid takings claim.196  An issue is also presented if the state creates 
a setback that is landward of an existing structure.197  While the structure 
is usually “grandfathered in” and allowed to remain, it typically must 
comply with the new setback if the structure is damaged and in need of 
being rebuilt.198  NOAA advises that setbacks “should clearly stipulate 
when (or if) it would be allowable for a building damaged or destroyed 
by a storm or chronic erosion to be rebuilt” and points to Maine’s rule as 
a good example: if the repairs will cost more than half of the existing 
structure’s value, it must comply with the setback.199  NOAA suggests 
that one way to avoid takings claims is to “ensure [that] waterfront lots 
are sufficiently deep to allow for relocation as the shore retreats.”200  In 
addition, NOAA asserts that states should create clear rules on whether 
and how setbacks move as the beach receives alluvion through natural 
and artificial accretion.201  As an example, NOAA points to New Jersey’s 
rule that denies a setback waiver for an accreting beach unless the 
applicant “can show the accreted beach offers sufficient increased 
protection from erosion.”202 
In theory, perhaps the best way to avoid takings claims with setbacks 
is to not use them and to instead utilize rolling easements.203  Because 
rolling easements only prevent littoral owners from buttressing the shore, 
owners “do not suffer large economic deprivations, and the many 
decades that will pass before the property is lost imply a small present 
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discounted value for whatever future loss one expects.”204  Rolling 
easements usually only reduce property values by less than one 
percent.205  Therefore, “the government could acquire rolling easements 
through eminent domain for less than one percent of current land 
values.”206  However, NOAA states that rolling easements are most 
effective when used in conjunction with setbacks and other 
restrictions,207 so while rolling easements are an extremely effective and 
low-risk coastal regulation tool, they are not a panacea for the problem of 
coastal overdevelopment. 
D.  Does the “Winner” of this Battle Depend on  
One’s Definition of “Winning?” 
Declaring a winner between private beachfront owners and the state 
in development of coastal zones is not an easy task.  While unchallenged, 
the state can regulate littoral owners to the point that they can build little 
more than sand castles on their property.  However, takings claims have 
provided littoral owners with ample recourse when the regulations are 
completely burdensome and unfair.  When the regulations are less 
severe, but still quite restrictive, court decisions are precarious and 
inconsistent.  So, whom do we declare the victor: the state that can push 
the edge of reasonableness or the littoral owner who can help define the 
edge of reasonableness through litigation?   
Results can vary from one type of regulation to another.  If winning 
is defined as being in control, the state wins with setbacks because it 
decides where coastal development begins and ends.  Then again, courts 
can pull the states back if they overreach.  With rolling easements, the 
littoral owner gets to do what he or she wants with the property, but 
when the water comes rushing in, the littoral owner has few options—
move or let the property be swept away so that in the end, the state gets 
what it wants anyway. 
However, by formulating fair, reasoned, and clear coastal 
development policies, the state can create an environment more 
conducive to win-win scenarios for the general public and littoral 
owners. 
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E.  Recommendations for Improved Coastal Development Regulations 
By heeding some of NOAA’s criticisms and advice and taking other 
logical steps forward, states can create more effective and clear coastal 
regulations that foster consensus among the public and beachfront 
owners and leave everyone more informed.  
When devising setbacks, states should rely on science-based erosion 
rates rather than choosing arbitrary distances from the water’s edge.  
However, states should also translate and explain this scientific 
information in a comprehensible manner for littoral owners so that they 
can better understand the possible uses of their property.  Because this 
data can be difficult and expensive to obtain, states should act now to 
ensure that their coastal agencies maintain good, readily accessible 
records of the state’s entire coastline, so that a solid foundation of 
available information is built for future use.  This data should be 
frequently collected so that the records can be constantly updated with 
only minimal changes necessary, as opposed to needing to note drastic 
changes because large amounts of time have passed between collections.  
Additionally, states should ensure that oceanfront lots are sufficiently 
deep to allow for relocation as water moves in, and they should take 
catastrophic events like hurricanes and tidal waves into account when 
formulating distances where it is safe for development to begin.  Like 
Maine and New Jersey, states also need to clearly delineate policies 
regarding (1) whether existing structures seaward of later-established 
setbacks can be rebuilt if damaged, and (2) whether setbacks move after 
the beach accretes.  
Finally, states that have not already done so should adopt the use of 
rolling easements.  While other coastal regulations and procedures will 
continue to be needed to address various coastal development issues, 
rolling easements are essential tools in mitigating many of these 
concerns.  As sea levels continue to rise and the public’s desire to visit 
beaches increases, preserving natural shorelines will continue to be a 
major state interest.  Rolling easements provide the easiest, lowest-risk, 
and most accommodating way to meet these goals.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
People fortunate enough to own oceanfront property encounter a 
unique set of issues that landlocked property owners do not.  Their rights 
and desires at times conflict with laws and policies that seek to protect 
the public’s right to enjoy coastal zones, and if they cannot be reconciled, 
then one right must be prioritized over the other.  
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Although property owners have the right to receive additional land 
created by artificial accretions and relictions, we have seen the highest 
court in the land declare that, fair or not, owners do not continue to have 
these rights after the state undertakes a project to restore beaches for the 
public’s benefit.  However, Stop the Beach Renourishment was an 
extraordinary case, and although some changes in the law may be 
helpful, the state and littoral owners have generally forged a compromise 
that benefits everyone. 
Public access laws vary greatly from state to state. Some states have 
created or interpreted laws in favor of public access and use over private 
littoral property, while others have not.  Furthermore, courts have used a 
variety of common law doctrines and statutes in making their 
determinations.  While it may seem that the public has the upper hand in 
this battle, the reality is that few people exercise their public access and 
use rights because they are not aware they have them, and there are 
insufficient amenities conducive to creating a pleasurable experience at 
the beach.  States should take a proactive role in defining their respective 
public access laws and explaining to littoral owners why the public needs 
to be able to cross their land.  
States have regulated coastal development in a variety of ways.  
However, they should address several details before implementing 
setbacks so that they can obviate many littoral owners’ frustrations and, 
consequently, possibly avoid takings claims.  Rolling easements will 
become an increasingly important tool as sea levels continue to rise with 
climate change and the public’s desire to flock to the nation’s beaches 
grows even stronger.  Not only do rolling easements provide littoral 
owners with greater options for use of their lands, but they help to create 
a regulatory environment where everyone gets to enjoy coastal zones in 
their own way.  Accordingly, everyone wins. 
 
